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Access to land: responsible landowner conduct under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 
Scotland is blessed with numerous areas where outdoor access for recreational and other purposes 
is both possible and popular. This brings opportunities, notably for the tourism industry and for the 
health and wellbeing of those taking access. It also brings challenges, relating to the pressure of 
access at any particular spot and interference with other land-based activities. 
Two national park authorities are charged with stewarding particularly important areas of Scotland 
under the National Parks (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 10) and related legislation. The areas in question 
are Loch Lomond and the Trossachs, and the Cairngorms. In some jurisdictions, national park 
authorities own the parks they manage outright. That is not the case in Scotland. This means 
national park authorities must work with local landowners and the wider community to achieve their 
statutory objectives. This they must do in a variety of ways. For present purposes, it is their role as 
access authorities for the areas they steward in terms of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 2) 
that is worthy of comment. This role sparked the case of Loch Lomond and Trossachs National Park 
Authority v Anstalt [2017] SAC (Civ) 11; 2017 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 138. (All paragraph references are to this 
case, and all statutory references are to the 2003 Act, unless otherwise stated.) 
Part 1 of the 2003 Act introduced rights of access to be on or to cross land, subject to limited 
exceptions. The exclusions from access relate to either the characteristics of any given parcel of land 
or the conduct of a (purported) access taker. No prior bargain or acquiescence by a land manager is 
required to authorise the crossing of land or any recreational, educational and in some cases 
commercial activity land on which access rights are exercisable (which I will refer to as “access land” 
for ease). Such conduct has already been authorised by the Scottish Parliament. In fact, the 
landowner must act responsibly when using, managing or otherwise conducting the ownership of 
access land. (For ease, I will render the 2003 Act’s “using, managing and conducting the ownership 
of land” as simply “managing”. “Landowner” is also used throughout, although under section 32 the 
term can equally apply to anyone else in natural possession of land, such as a tenant.) As we shall 
see, the Access Code – a document provided for in section 10 of the 2003 Act and approved by the 
Scottish Parliament – is an important factor in determining whether a landowner or anyone else has 
acted responsibly. There are also some situations which can never be responsible landowner 
conduct in terms of section 3(2)(a) read alongside other sections including section 14(1), namely 
where they act (or indeed fail to act) in a way that disincentives access. 
Access rights at Drumlean – the issues 
Much could be and has been written about the Scottish access regime. This note will focus on the 
two aspects that were at issue in this case, which related to a landowner’s choices to limit and 
discourage access to an area of some 120 hectares described in the opinion as comprising “open 
hillside, in by fields and woodlands” (paragraph 4) at the Drumlean estate in the shadow of Ben 
Venue (just one of the impressive hills in the Trossachs which draw many people there). In this 
particular instance, three gates to the enclosure were left in a default locked position, and a sign 
warned of the danger of wild boar when there were in fact no such animals present. (Other animals 
– namely deer – were present.) These had the effect of restricting and discouraging access to 10% of 
the whole estate. In the scheme of the 2003 Act, access authorities have a duty to uphold access 
rights (section 13). They can do this in a variety of ways, including serving a notice when they 
consider there has been a breach of section 14(1) (which is set out in full below). This is exactly what 
the relevant access authority did. 
From an access rights perspective, the issue to determine was whether the enclosure of the land 
was a contravention of section 14. This involved the consideration of two aspects. If the land was not 
access land, that would have been determinative of the case (as the access authority would not have 
been able to object), but as we shall see the nuance here was actually the time when the barrier was 
created, as the 2003 Act does not retrospectively target physical barriers to access which were in 
place before the law came into force. The second aspect was whether the purpose or main purpose 
of the landowner’s choices was not simply to inhibit access. In other words, was there was a 
legitimate land management reason for them? 
At first instance, the sheriff held that, as the matters complained of had begun before the 2003 Act 
introduced the new access regime, the land was not accessible. This was characterised by the parties 
to the case and the court as the “timing issue”. The sheriff then noted in any event that landowner 
had acted in a way that would have been responsible land management of access land. Central to 
this is the question of why the landowner acted (or omitted to act): this was the “purpose issue”. The 
access authority appealed and, as we shall see, was successful on both points. Another issue the 
Sheriff Appeal Court faced was whether it was appropriate for it to review the evidence presented to 
the lower court (and relatedly to consider evidence that the lower court had excluded). The 
appellate court noted that the bar for interfering with the original fact finder’s findings is set high, 
but felt it was appropriate to revisit matters by reference to the transcript in the circumstances 
(paragraphs 55-58). There was also an issue about privilege and the exclusion of certain advice that 
had been led in evidence (under reservation) about discussions between the parties and advice the 
landowner had received (paragraphs 45-46). This had led to evidence that pertained to the purpose 
issue not being considered at first instance. The Sheriff Appeal Court (adopting the submissions for 
the appellant made at paragraph 21) ruled this could be considered. Notwithstanding the 
importance of these points about privilege and the role of an appellate court, this note will now 
focus on issues relating to the 2003 Act. 
With the regime in the 2003 Act in mind, anyone wishing to understand how the legislation works in 
general and understand how situations like this can be dealt with would do well to read paragraphs 
5 to 11 of the opinion of the Sheriff Appeal Court, which sets out the law clearly. The opinion was 
delivered by Sheriff Principal Stephen, QC. She also delivered the judgment in one of the first cases 
on the 2003 Act, namely Caledonian Heritable Limited v East Lothian Council, Haddington Sheriff 
Court, 28 Apr 2006 (case reference B401/05) (available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/search-
judgments/judgment?id=bb0187a6-8980-69d2-b500-ff0000d74aa7). That judgment was important 
because of when it occurred, but it was also important in setting out how section 14 of the 2003 Act 
operates. There, the access authority objected to signage, barriers and the removal of a bridge and 
after the judgment of Sheriff Stephen (as she then was) the situation was resolved to the access 
authority’s satisfaction. Section 14 was again at issue in this case, giving Sheriff Principal Stephen a 
welcome opportunity to bring her experience to bear here.  
The timing issue 
The land at issue did not host any features that would render it excluded from access under section 
6 of the 2003 Act. This meant the landowner had to comply with section 14(1). It prohibits signs, 
obstructions, dangerous impediments and the like. It is too important to paraphrase and is worth 
setting out in full, with my emphasis added at one passage. It provides: 
The owner of land in respect of which access rights are exercisable shall not, for the purpose 
or for the main purpose of preventing or deterring any person entitled to exercise these 
rights from doing so— 
(a) put up any sign or notice; 
(b) put up any fence or wall, or plant, grow or permit to grow any hedge, tree or other 
vegetation; 
(c) position or leave at large any animal; 
(d) carry out any agricultural or other operation on the land; or 
(e) take, or fail to take, any other action. 
The italicised text will be returned to below. Dealing first with the wording in paragraphs (a)-(e), 
clear as the wording is there has still been litigation about the provision. The case of Aviemore 
Highland Resort Limited v Cairngorms National Park Authority 2009 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 97 related to 
barriers which existed prior to the 2003 Act coming into force. Essentially, owing to the framing of 
(a) and (b) – which both target the putting up of signs, notices, fences, or walls – a barrier that was in 
position prior to 2005 is not in contravention of the section. In Aviemore, the issue related to a fence 
which had been erected across a lane in 2004. The access authority served a section 14(2) notice 
about the fence. The problem for the access authority was the law which regulated new features like 
the fence was not in force when the fence was erected, and that the law was not retrospective. As 
noted by the Sheriff Principal who ultimately ruled against the access authority, the prohibition did 
not extend to (for example) the maintenance of an existing one. The notice accordingly failed. (There 
was also a hedge that followed the line of the fence which section 14 might have regulated (in 
relation to the growing of it, rather than the planting, albeit the date of planting was not clear). The 
notice was not framed in a way that caught the hedge, so this issue was not tested.) 
The Drumlean case was different: in fact, it was described in court as “the antithesis of the Aviemore 
situation” (paragraph 38). It was not about the erection of barriers in contravention of section 
14(1)(b), but rather the continuing failure of the respondent to unlock gates under section 14(1)(e). 
In this connection, the obvious but legally useful distinction between a gate (which is designed to 
open) and a fence (which does not) was made. This case highlights (at paragraph 39) that the 2003 
Act can impose a positive obligation on a landowner, namely “to consider, among other things, 
whether gates which had previously been locked, should be unlocked so as to enable the access 
rights created by the Act, to be exercised.” For these seeking to contextualise what the change in the 
law meant and means for landowners, this is a helpful observation. 
The court also noted that it would be absurd if a gate which was locked at a minute to midnight 
before the 2003 Act could stay locked thereafter owing to that happenstance (paragraph 41). The 
court accordingly held that the landowner was not entitled to continue to refuse access to the land 
by continuing to lock the gates after the Act came into force, subject to possible circumstances 
where the gate needed to be locked for a genuine purpose (this being discussed below). The court 
separately held that the owner could not display a sign warning of the dangers of wild boar 
(particularly as there were in fact no wild boar) (paragraph 42. Paragraph 4.9 of the Access Code is in 
point here. It notes “asking people to avoid using a route or area when there is no safety-related 
reason to do so, or keeping up such a sign when the hazard has ceased” is an example of what would 
be unreasonable interference with access rights). 
The purpose issue 
The trickier aspect of section 14(1) is revealed by the wording that allows a landowner to take any of 
the steps listed in paragraphs (a)-(e) when “the purpose or…the main purpose” of doing so is 
something other than preventing or deterring the exercise of access rights. This means an act or 
omission that is wholly or mainly targets access is caught, but a legitimate land management activity 
undertaken in accordance with the Access Code, which might catch some or all forms of access in 
the crossfire, is not. 
Reference can again be made to prior case law. Tuley v The Highland Council 2009 S.L.T. 616 shows 
that a genuine land management decision that is not fixated on preventing or deterring access is 
acceptable. In that case (discussed in Malcolm M. Combe, “Access to land and to landownership” 
(2010) 14 Edinburgh Law Review 106), the landowners actually wished to facilitate access to their 
land in the Black Isle, but were rightly concerned about the cumulative effect of ongoing equestrian 
access to a particular track. They sought to close that access to horses, whilst leaving another route 
available for horse riders. The access authority objected to the route closure. The Court of Session 
ultimately ruled that the closure was permitted, as it was not wholly or mainly for the purpose of 
preventing or deterring access. 
In the Drumlean dispute, whilst the sheriff had initially ruled that the landowner’s purpose was 
acceptable, as noted below the Sheriff Appeal Court disagreed.  
This case, and Tuley, both proceeded on the basis that this is to be measured subjectively, i.e. what 
did the land manager actually think. It is now clear that future cases must be approached in the 
same way. This case also raised a further important point, when it was noted “even if the [land 
manager]’s expressed concerns were to be accepted as genuinely held, the section 14 prohibition 
would still apply, because the professed concerns are so broadly expressed that they amount to 
arguments against access rights in general rather than in relation to this particular estate.” 
The clarification (at paragraph 64) that a landowner’s concerns must relate to a particular site rather 
than access rights in general is an important one: if there is an argument to be had against access 
rights in general, that would need to be played out by law-makers, with any “victory” for that 
position being the repeal of Part 1 of the 2003 Act. 
Responsible land management and the role of the Access Code 
Observations in a previous sheriff court case had suggested that the Access Code is of limited use 
when determining whether land is excluded (Gloag v Perth and Kinross Council 2007 SCLR 530). 
Whilst it is true that the Access Code has no statutory role in relation to determining the extent of 
excluded land under section 6, the Drumlean case offers a judicial reinvigoration of the Access Code, 
first in approving a passage of it (at paragraph 31, endorsing paragraph 1.1 of the Access Code) and 
then by making its importance in the responsible conduct mix clear. As the Sheriff Appeal Court put 
it, “at the very least” the Access Code should be “taken into account” when assessing a land 
manager’s conduct (paragraph 53). That is something the sheriff at first instance did not do.  
The Access Code has an important role in the calculation of whether an access taker (or purported 
access taker) is responsible under section 2(2)(b)(i) of the 2003 Act, which directs that regard is to be 
had as to whether that person has disregarded the guidance in the Access Code. The Drumlean case 
highlights the importance of the Access Code under the mirror provision for landowners in section 3, 
confirming that it is mandatory to have regard to it when assessing what is responsible (paragraph 
32). 
In terms of whether the particular conduct at issue was responsible, it is now beyond doubt that the 
test for this is an objective one which has regard to the Access Code (paragraph 34). In applying that 
test to the case at hand, the Sheriff Appeal Court highlighted no less than six problems with the 
sheriff’s initial approach. These related to his: a) erroneous exclusion of evidence (highlighted 
above); b) eventual treatment of the landowner’s representative’s evidence, which had evolved 
from unfavourable to credible and reliable without explanation (paragraph 48); and c) treatment of 
the evidence of the appellant’s access and recreation adviser, which was apparently tainted by the 
fact the witness’s characterisation of the law differed from that of the sheriff, but then the Sheriff 
Appeal Court found themselves to “broadly support” the access and recreation adviser’s view 
(paragraph 49). Three further failures are then listed at (paragraph 50), namely the failure to: d) 
make any finding in fact as to what the respondent’s purpose was; e) have regard to the access 
code; and f) appreciate that many of the respondent’s professed concerns, even if genuine, were of 
such general application that they could not properly amount to a legitimate purpose for the 
purposes of section 14. The opinion then goes on to explain these failures, highlighting what section 
of the Access Code regard could have been had to in the process (paragraph 53, highlighting 
paragraphs 3.29-3.34 of the Access Code, on accessing fields with livestock). That these points were 
adumbrated so clearly will surely have the effect of making the judgment appeal-proof. Be that as it 
may, the opinion once again provides a helpful resource for those seeking guidance in approaching 
access disputes, securing the status of the Access Code in the process.  
The Sheriff Appeal Court then went on to consider the issue de novo, and saw fit to highlight that the 
representative of the landowner held views which were inconsistent with the Access Code (and 
further, that this representative claimed never to have seen the Access Code and then failed to 
answer a question as to whether he had given thought to the terms of it) (paragraph 62). In 
evidence, this representative expressed the view that members of the public ought to be excluded 
from land where access rights could be exercised for the protection of the public themselves and of 
the animals (in this case deer) that were there and also for the security of machinery there, but this 
view was not supported by advice which he had been given (which he was reliant on, as he had no 
relevant qualifications in relation to the practical running of the estate: paragraph 65, additional 
finding in fact 20) or by the Access Code. To the extent a lack of knowledge of the Access Code might 
have been understandable (but not exactly forgivable) in the immediate aftermath of the legislation 
coming into force, it is patently not acceptable over a decade after the change in the law. 
A word on excluded land 
Was the enclosure excluded land in terms of section 6? Clearly not, in light of the foregoing 
discussion, and also in light of the point made (at paragraph 40) that one exclusion specifically 
legislated for in the 2003 Act (at section 6(1)(f), allowing for historic fee charging regimes at sites to 
continue) would have been otiose if enclosed but gated land was already excluded.  
One targeted observation of the Sheriff Appeal Court (made in response to a point made by counsel 
for the respondent) also deserves highlighting in this regard. In terms of whether the enclosure 
could be entitled to special regulatory treatment as a result of a holistic view of the estate, the court 
noted (at paragraph 63): "it matters not that access is available to other parts of the estate, nor that 
the enclosed area constitutes only some 10 percent of the total area of the estate. Bearing in mind 
that the rights conferred by the Act are not restricted to crossing land, but include the right to be on 
land, that is nothing to the point. Access rights exist over all land which is not excepted, and are not 
to be restricted to the majority of all non-excepted land.” 
Competing interests? 
As we have seen, the access authority in this case was successful, and those involved in the access 
lobby will be grateful to it for taking this important case to appeal. For completeness, it can be noted 
that that this access authority should not be characterised as being in favour of all access in all 
circumstances. Recent byelaws of Loch Lomond and The Trossachs National Park Authority (available 
at http://www.lochlomond-trossachs.org/things-to-do/camping/campingbyelaws/) have been 
controversial, particularly as responsible access takers are now unable to wild camp as a result of the 
steps taken by the access authority (triggered by irresponsible recreational access) to restrict 
camping to designated areas. It can also be noted that access is not without its (physical) risks to 
access takers and (legal) risks to occupiers of land, as highlighted in the Leonard v Loch Lomond and 
The Trossachs National Park Authority [2014] CSOH 38, affirmed [2015] CSIH 44. There is no 
particular indication in the case report as to whether the outing (in 2006) that led to the case was 
inspired by the new access regime. Either way, section 5(2) specifically operates to keep occupiers 
on the hook, although in that case the pursuer failed to establish the liability of the access authority. 
These two episodes demonstrate that access authorities have a difficult balancing act at times, much 
like access takers and landowners themselves do in the overall scheme of the legislation. 
Concluding observations 
Two final tangents will be offered, about names. In the published judgment in the Drumlean case, 
the pursuer is named as “Loch Lomond and Trossachs National Park Authority” rather than “Loch 
Lomond and The Trossachs National Park Authority” (emphasis added). The version with the definite 
article is correct in terms of article 4 of The Loch Lomond and The Trossachs National Park 
Designation, Transitional and Consequential Provisions (Scotland) Order 2002 (SSI 2002/201) but this 
guide stays true to the judgment issued. 
Finally, in its Scots Gaelic form, Ben Venue is A’ Bheinn Mheanbh, which means the miniature 
mountain. There seems to be a certain irony in the fact that the landowner of the Drumlean estate 
objected so strongly to access taken below the miniature mountain, and thus made a mountain out 
of a molehill.  
Those tangents notwithstanding, what will the legal legacy of the Drumlean case be? Another irony 
emerges, namely that this individual attempt to roundly object to access has resulted in such a clear 
and useful discussion of how access rights work. Responsible access takers should maybe be grateful 
for the (former) land management practices at Drumlean after all. 
